
Santayana and the Dangerous Uses of the Past

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” wrote George Santayana.
I agree that some of the people capable of causing historic disasters—and some of those who support them and believe in them—may indeed know very little history.
I even concede that someone still undecided, or repeating a dangerous slogan for a laugh, may stop when they discover where it once led. What seemed harmless at a distance can become rather less amusing once the consequences are understood.
But history never returns in quite the same circumstances, which gives anyone determined to try again plenty of room to explain why the comparison is ridiculous and why this time, under their direction, everything will turn out differently.
That is where I lose faith in the comforting idea we have attached to Santayana’s sentence: that a better knowledge of the past would necessarily save us from repeating its disasters.
My conviction is that learning more would make some people pursue the same ambitions with even greater determination.
The circumstances are never quite the same, but as Faulkner wrote:
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”
Here dwell both our hopes and our anxieties.
The sentence inside the book
Santayana’s warning appears in “Flux and Constancy in Human Nature,” the final chapter of Reason in Common Sense (1905), the first of five volumes of The Life of Reason.
Just before it, he compares memory to the way a note takes on a different character from the tensions left by the notes that precede it. Its pitch can stay the same while what we hear in it changes. A remembered experience can do something similar to a decision that appears to concern only the present.
“Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness.”
Someone who forgets what caused yesterday’s pain has to learn the connection again, at the same cost.
In the same passage, Santayana imagines the opposite difficulty. A person can hold on to settled habits so rigidly that fresh experience gives them nothing to think about. He places maturity between those conditions, at the point where a mind keeps enough of its past to take something in from the present.
What the mind learns may help it satisfy a desire it has never had occasion to question. Across The Life of Reason, reflection asks how the things we want can coexist and what their pursuit costs. An ambition can become more achievable without becoming more defensible.
A Bonaparte remembers
On December 2, 1851, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, the elected president of France, dissolved the National Assembly in a coup. The constitution barred him from serving a second consecutive term. He chose the anniversary of his uncle’s coronation in 1804 and of his victory at Austerlitz in 1805. The date invited the French to read what was happening in Paris as the next event in a family history they already knew.
In the plebiscite of December 20 and 21, he asked French voters to keep him in office and authorize him to draw up a new constitution. Its preamble cited their approval as its warrant. Article 2 entrusted the government of the republic to its sitting president for ten years.
In the proclamation introducing the constitution of January 14, 1852, Louis-Napoléon asked the French to consider how much of his uncle’s work they still lived with. Their courts, finances, and army, he argued, continued to depend on arrangements made under the Consulate and the Empire.
If France still relied on Napoleon’s institutions to administer its laws, collect its revenues, and organize its army, why hesitate over his politics?
The question sounds almost like a proposal to finish some administrative business. Article 8 gives the question a most practical answer, as deputies could discuss and vote on bills, but the president alone had the right to introduce them. A court could keep working for fifty years while the case for giving a president that power still could be yet to be made.
Even the fall of the First Empire had a place in the argument. Its institutions, Louis-Napoléon claimed, had been overthrown only by the combined forces of Europe.
That gave him a way to account for the defeat all while leaving his judgment of the institutions intact.
He could ask his audience to take their survival where they still worked as proof of their merits and take their overthrow where they had disappeared as proof of the strength of their opponents.
In December 1852, he became Emperor of the French as Napoleon III.
Whose progress?
In Reason in Science (1906), the last volume of The Life of Reason, Santayana asks whether Columbus crossed the Atlantic so that George Washington could exist and football and the Church of England could one day prevail throughout the world.
The longer he keeps the sentence going, the harder it becomes to mistake the observer’s list of favored outcomes for an explanation of why the ships sailed.
Santayana makes room in the same chapter for a historian to ask what an event was worth. He asks the historian to consider “all real interests affected,” as far as they can be understood. People affected by a single act will often have wanted incompatible things. Even one person may have cause to welcome part of what happened and to fear the rest.
On December 2, the notices posted in Paris announced both the dissolution of the Assembly and the restoration of universal male suffrage. A worker who had to move to find a job might have lost his vote under the law of 1850, which required three years of local residence. Now he could vote again.
The following day Alphonse Baudin, a deputy resisting the coup, was killed on a barricade in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. The worker’s restored vote was worth having. Its value also depended on what the next assembly would be allowed to do.
And so it seems that a man can remember the defeat of an empire, study its causes, and prepare to avoid them, while leaving his desire for empire entirely untouched.

Sources and Further Reading
1. George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, chapter XII, “Flux and Constancy in Human Nature,” pp. 284–285 in the 1920 Scribner edition. Page image and transcription.
2. William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun (1951), Act I, Scene III. Gavin Stevens speaks to Temple Drake. University of Virginia’s Digital Yoknapatawpha edition guide.
3. Fondation Napoléon, Life and Reign of Napoleon III, timeline entries for 1851–1852.
4. Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, proclamation of January 14, 1852, and the Constitution of January 14, 1852, especially articles 2, 8, and 39.
5. George Santayana, Reason in Science, chapter II, “History,” 1921 Scribner printing, pp. 55–56 and 59.
6. Assemblée nationale, the coup of December 2, 1851 and the dissolution and suffrage notices.
7. Fondation Napoléon, Le coup d’État du 2 décembre 1851, section on December 3 and 4, for Baudin and the Faubourg Saint-Antoine.



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